

# Robotics and Integrated Formal Methods: Necessity meets Opportunity

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# Robotic System Properties

## Multi-dimensional:

- ▶ Embedded System



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# What is an *Integrated* Formal Method

## Integrated Formal Methods (iFM)

- ▶ Integrating multiple formal methods
  - ▶ *Loose*: cooperating formalisms
  - ▶ *Tight*: single formalism
- ▶ Integration of formal and non-formal methods
  - ▶ e.g. Graphical notation



# Necessity meets Opportunity

## Necessity meets Opportunity

- ▶ Based on our previous survey work...
  - ▶ Available: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00048>
- ▶ Robotics:
  - ▶ Present particular challenges
  - ▶ Require integration of diverse formal methods
- ▶ Formal Methods Benefits:
  - ▶ Real-World catalyst for integration research

## Next...

- ▶ Highlight four robotics challenges
  - ▶ Environment
  - ▶ Certification
  - ▶ Multi-Robot Systems
  - ▶ Reconfiguration
- ▶ Discuss integrated formal approaches
  - ▶ Current
  - ▶ Direction

## Challenge One: Modelling the Physical Environment

# Modelling the Physical Environment

## Challenge:

- ▶ How to specify and verify the behaviour of the robot working in a dynamic and often unknown environment



## Current Approaches:

- ▶ Ignore the environment!<sup>a</sup>
- ▶ Assume that the environment it is static and known, prior to deployment<sup>b</sup>
- ▶ Use predicates representing sensor data to abstract away from the environment<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Savas Konur, Clare Dixon, and Michael Fisher. “Analysing Robot Swarm Behaviour via Probabilistic Model Checking”. In: *Robotics and Autonomous Systems* 60.2 (2012), pp. 199–213.

<sup>b</sup>Salar Moarref and Hadas Kress-Gazit. “Decentralized control of robotic swarms from high-level temporal logic specifications”. In: *Int. Symp. Multi-Robot Multi-Agent Syst.* IEEE, 2017.

<sup>c</sup>Michael Fisher, Louise A Dennis, and Matt Webster. “Verifying Autonomous Systems”. In: *Commun. ACM* 56.9 (2013), pp. 84–93.

# Modelling the Physical Environment

## Formal Methods must bridge the *reality gap*:

- ▶ Model the environment using
  - ▶ e.g. Probabilistic Temporal Logic (PTL)<sup>a</sup>
- ▶ Monitor the environment
  - ▶ e.g. Timed Automata<sup>b</sup>



<sup>a</sup>M. Webster et al. "Toward Reliable Autonomous Robotic Assistants Through Formal Verification: A Case Study". In: *IEEE Transactions on Human-Machine Systems* 46.2 (2016), pp. 186–196.

<sup>b</sup>Adina Aniculaesei et al. "Towards the Verification of Safety-critical Autonomous Systems in Dynamic Environments". In: *Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci.* 232 (2016), pp. 79–90.

## Challenge Two: Trust and Certification Evidence



## Operating Context

1. Safety-Critical e.g. nuclear/aerospace



2. Require public trust



## Challenges:

- ▶ Formal verification must provide appropriate evidence for
  - ▶ Public Trust
  - ▶ Regulator Certification
- ▶ Which formal methods are suitable?
  - ▶ What evidence is needed?
  - ▶ What type of robotic system?

# Trust and Certification Evidence

## Current Approaches:

- ▶ Automatic generation of safety case
  - ▶ e.g. AUTOCERT for a pilotless aircraft<sup>a</sup>
- ▶ Formalising and verifying domain specific rules
  - ▶ e.g. Isabelle/HOL to formalise rules for vehicle overtaking<sup>b</sup>



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<sup>a</sup>Ewen Denney and Ganesh Pai. "Automating the assembly of aviation safety cases". In: *IEEE Transactions on Reliability* 63.4 (2014), pp. 830–849.

<sup>b</sup>Albert Rizaldi et al. "Formalising and monitoring traffic rules for autonomous vehicles in Isabelle/HOL". In: *Integr. Form. Methods*. Vol. 10510. LNCS. 2017, pp. 50–66.

## Challenge Three: Multi-Robot Systems

## Types of Multi-Robot Systems

- ▶ Homogeneous robots: *Swarms*
- ▶ Heterogeneous robots: *Teams*

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# Multi-Robot Systems



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# Multi-Robot Systems: Swarms



## Challenges:

- ▶ Linking formal specifications
  - ▶ macroscopic (whole swarm) level
  - ▶ microscopic (individual robots) level
- ▶ State explosion when model-checking large swarms.



# Multi-Robot Systems: Swarms



## Current Approaches:

- ▶ Temporal logics
  - ▶ Specify and verify swarms at different levels of abstraction<sup>a</sup>
- ▶ Abstractions to mitigate state explosion<sup>b</sup>
  - ▶ Symmetry reduction
  - ▶ Counting abstraction

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<sup>a</sup>Alan F.T. Winfield et al. "On formal specification of emergent behaviours in swarm robotic systems". In: *Int. J. Adv. Robot. Syst.* 2.4 (2005), pp. 363–370.

<sup>b</sup>Savas Konur, Clare Dixon, and Michael Fisher. "Analysing Robot Swarm Behaviour via Probabilistic Model Checking". In: *Robotics and Autonomous Systems* 60.2 (2012), pp. 199–213.

# Multi-Robot Systems: Teams



## Challenge:

- ▶ Linking specification
  - ▶ macroscopic (whole team) level
  - ▶ microscopic (individual robots) level
- ▶ Heterogeneity...

## Challenge Four: Adaptation, Reconfigurability, and Autonomy

## Challenge

- ▶ Specifying self-adaptive systems
  - ▶ Respond to changes in the environment
- ▶ Specifying reconfigurable systems
  - ▶ *Decide* on how best to reconfigure themselves
- ▶ Specifying reconfigurability
  - ▶ *Autonomous* decision-making

## Current Approaches:

- ▶ Model-checking at runtime for self-adaptive systems<sup>a</sup>
- ▶ Agent-based systems to model autonomy
  - ▶ Verified using temporal logics and model-checkers
  - ▶ e.g. probabilistic model-checking of autonomous mine detector robot<sup>b</sup>

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<sup>a</sup>Betty H.C. Cheng et al. "Using models at runtime to address assurance for self-adaptive systems". In: *Models@run.time*. Vol. 8378. LNCS. 2014, pp. 101–136.

<sup>b</sup>Paolo Izzo, Hongyang Qu, and Sandor M. Veres. "A stochastically verifiable autonomous control architecture with reasoning". In: *Conf. Decis. Control* (2016), pp. 4985–4991.

# Integrated Formal Approaches to Robotic Challenges

# Why iFM?

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### 1 Environment

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## iFM Can...

- 1 Combine static and dynamic models
- 2 Provide robust evidence
- 3 Link macro- and micro- behaviour
- 4 Describe complex configuration and autonomy

## Adoption

- ▶ Event-B and PRISM
  - ▶ Reconfigurable architecture for an on-board satellite system
- ▶ CSP || B
  - ▶ Vehicle platooning
- ▶ AJPF, UPPAAL, and Spatial Calculus
  - ▶ Platoon joining and leaving procedures for a driverless car
- ▶ FSP and  $\pi$ ADL for safety
  - ▶ Multi-agent systems
- ▶ RoboChart
  - ▶ State Charts with CSP underneath

## Complementary methods

- ▶ Benefits of two formal methods
  - ▶ e.g. model-checking and proof-based methods
- ▶ Benefits of formal method and existing non-formal method
  - ▶ Robust (auto-generated?) evidence for certification



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- ▶ Link abstract specifications of nodes...
- ▶ ...with the specification of the node
- ▶ Convert between verification tools
- ▶ Challenges:

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  - ▶ Different formalisms?
  - ▶ Different properties?

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  - ▶ Different formalisms?
  - ▶ Different properties?
  - ▶ Consistency of properties and information?

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**Robotics:** integration of formal methods into the development process and potential solutions to the four challenges identified earlier.

**iFM:** a set of real-world targets that will help to advance the field in new and exciting directions.

## Motivating Survey:

Luckcuck, M., Farrell, M., Dennis, L., Dixon, C., & Fisher, M. (2018). *Formal Specification and Verification of Autonomous Robotic Systems: A Survey*. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.00048.

## Robotics and Artificial Intelligence in Hazardous Environments:

- ▶ RAIN: <https://rainhub.org.uk/>
- ▶ ORCA: <https://orcahub.org/>
- ▶ FAIR-SPACE: <https://www.fairspacehub.org/>



ROBOTICS AND AI IN NUCLEAR



# Questions?